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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONsTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS EXTENDED TO JUVENILE COURT PRO-
CEEDINGS IF THE FINAL ACTION BY THE COURT MAY RESTRICT
THE JUVENILE'S LIBERTY. Garrison v. Jennings, 529 P.2d 536
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
On December 7, 1974, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
granted a writ of prohibition against a juvenile court judge to prevent
him from certifying Wayne Garrison, a juvenile, to stand trial as an
adult for the crime of murder.
The original proceedings were initiated in 1972 by a petition seek-
ing to have Garrison adjudicated in juvenile court as a "delinquent."'
In that petition facts were set forth alleging that Garrison caused the
death of another by strangulation, using a cloth tied around the victim's
neck. Subsequently the petitioner was sent to Central State Hospital
at Norman, Oklahoma for an evaluation while the petition remained
pending for six weeks. Upon peititoner's return another hearing was
held at which time the state asked and was granted permission to
amend the petition to read that Garrison was a "child in need of super-
vision" (CHINS).2 The court expressly found that the amended peti-
tion was true after the defense counsel stipulated to the allegations set
forth in the petition. Garrison was then sent to Central State Hospital
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(a) and § 1101(b) (1974) provide:
When used in this act, unless the context other wise requires:
(a) The term "child" means any person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(b) The term "delinquent child" means (1) a child who has violated any
federal or state law or municipal ordinancs, excepting a traffic statute
or ordinance, or any lawful order of the court made under this act; or
(2) a child who has habitually violated traffic laws or ordinances.
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(c) (1974) provides:
(c) The term "child in need of supervision" means a child who is habitually
truant from school, or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian
or other custodian, or who habitually deports himself so as to injure or
endanger the health or morals of himself or others.
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for treatment for a period which could have lasted until he was 21 years
of age.3
Two years later the Tulsa County District Attorney's Office filed
an amended petition to have Garrison adjudicated a "delinquent" based
upon the same facts as were alleged in the original 1972 petition. The
legality of such an act was presented to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals by a petition seeking a writ of prohibition charging that to have
Garrison adjudged a "delinquent" (a predicate to certification to stand
trial as an adult)4 on the same facts which two years earlier furnished
the grounds for adjudging him a "child in need of supervision!' would
violate the constitutional protection against twice being placed in
jeopardy for the same offense5 as well as his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.6
Historically the constitutional guarantee against being "twice put
in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense" has not been applied
to juveniles as it has to adults. The ability of the courts to ignore ju-
venile rights stemmed from the parens patriae philosophy adopted by
the first juvenile court in this country in 1899. The parens patriae
theory was developed to accommodate concepts of rehabilitation rather
than punishment, informal rather than formal proceedings, and the idea
that the juvenile courts were civil or equitable in nature rather than
criminal. 8 This "civil" theory provided the basis upon which the courts
could ignore constitutional safeguards for juveniles but apply them to
criminal proceedings where adults were concerned.9
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1102 provides:
Jurisdiction of District Court-Transfer of proceedings .... When jurisdic-
tion shall have been obtained over any child, it may be retained until the child
becomes twenty-one (21) years of age....
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1112(b)(8) (1974) provides:
[A]fter full investigation and a preliminary hearing, (the juvenile court] may
in its discretion continue the juvenile proceeding, or it may certify such child
capable of knowing right from wrong, and to be held accountable for his acts,
for proper criminal proceedings to any other division of the court which would
have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Supra note 5.S. M. PAULSEN & C. WrrEREAD, JUVENYLE LAw AND PaocDnun 14(1974).
9. FLEXNER & OPPENHEIMER, THE LucAr ASPECr oF THE JUVENmLE COURT 8-9
(1922); see People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953), where
a minor was adjudged a ward of the court following a burglary charge, confined fifteen
months to an institution, and then returned to juvenile court where he was certified to
stand trial as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to prison. The court held that the pro-
tection against double jeopardy was not applicable because the juvenile proceedings were
non-criminal. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Ex parte
Sharp 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908); In re Santillanes 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503
(1943); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
1975]
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Since the 1950's the state courts have gradually moved away from
characterizing all juvenile proceedings as "civil," and in the 1960's
several momentous United States Supreme Court decisions provided
more impetus to this movement. Application of Johnson recognized
the trend toward allowing "no greater diminution of the rights of a
child, as safeguarded by the Constitution, than should be suffered by
an adult charged with an offense equivalent to the alleged act of
delinquency of the child."'10 Other courts have taken a middle course
and maintained the civil label (perhaps because not all proceedings
before the juvenile court concern merely delinquency problems) while
applying the limitations and guarantees of the Constitution where a
crime is charged." Hegwood v. Kindrick put it this way:
[S]ome, if not all, of the Bill of Rights criminal guarantees
must be made available in juvenile court proceedings. Ad-
vocates of this view sweep aside technical distinctions be-
tween civil and criminal cases when the juvenile has been
charged with an offense which, if committed by an adult,
would render him liable to criminal prosecution. . . . Ad-
vocates of this approach have been impressed by the growing
discrepancy between the theory of parens patriae and its actual
practice in the juvenile courts. 2
In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio1 was the first step in the process of apply-
ing those portions of the Bill of Rights which concern criminal proce-
dure to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
But it was not until 1966 that the Supreme Court heard its first
due process appeal from a juvenile court. In Kent v. United States,'4
the juvenile court's jurisdiction over Kent was "waived," and he then
stood trial as an adult and was found guilty of house-breaking. The
waiver proceedings were attacked on the basis that there had been no
hearing, no findings of fact, no counsel for the accused, and no rea-
sons for waiving jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion on the grounds that "the hearing must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment."' 5
10: Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155, 160 (NJ. 1957).
11. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955).
12. Hegwood v. Kindrick, 264 F. Supp. 72D, 725 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Prior to Kent, in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), the United States Supreme Court applied
the voluntariness requirement to confessions obtained from juveniles, but the cases do
not appear to have been juvenile court decisions.
15. 383 U.S. at 562.
[Vol. 10:690
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The next year In re Gault"0 required the application of due proc-
ess standards to the adudicatory hearings including adequate, timely
written notice of the charges against the juvenile. Where the juvenile's
liberty was at issue the Court ruled that he was entitled to notice, coun-
sel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront
and cross-examine opposing witnesses under oath. The Court also at-
tacked the "civil" label by saying:
To hold otherwise [to deny the applicability of due process]
would be to disregard substance because of the feeble entice-
ment of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been at-
tached to juvenile proceedings. . . . For this purpose, at
least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarcera-
tion against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or
"civil."' 1
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings
is now required' s and the method of taking confessions cannot violate
the due process clause. 9
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania ° announced one limited but important
exception to the extension of constitutional rights to juvenile proceed-
ings. There the Court relied on the original juvenile court philosophy
of informality and denied the juvenile the right to a trial by jury. The
Court explained that it hoped to prevent juvenile proceedings from be-
coming like criminal trials.2 In what seems almost paradoxical fashion
the Court relied on Gault and Winship and reiterated the fundamental
fairness test as the due process standard in juvenile court proceedings,
while at the same time denying that al of the constitutional rights af-
forded adults are applicable to juveniles. The Court emphasized the
fact-finding procedure, denied that a jury is a necessary part of that
procedure, but upheld the requirements of notice, counsel, confronta-
tion, cross examination, and standard of proof. The Court did not deal
with double jeopardy.
As late as 1966 it was said that:
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 49-50.
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962).
20. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
21. Oklahoma, by statute, has given juveniles the right to a jury trial in spite of
McKeiver. Okla Stat. tit. 10, § 1110 provides:
In hearings to determine whether a child is within the purview of this Act, the
child informed against, or any person interested in such child, shall have the
right to demand a trial by jury, which shall be granted as in other cases, unless
waived, or the judge on his own motion may call a jury to try any such case.
Such jury shall consist of six (6) persons.
19751
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The least litigated issue in the area of procedural protections
and constitutional rights in the juvenile courts is protection
against double jeopardy. While there is some authority go-
ing each way, the great majority of cases hold there is no pro-
tection, and most of the contrary authority is rather recent.2
Although Benton v. Maryland" applied the double jeopardy protection
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, there are no Supreme
Court cases as yet specifically granting to juveniles this protection, but
the trend is clearly reflected in recent state and lower federal court de-
cisions. United States v. Dickerson24 is perhaps the earliest case of sig-
nificance regarding double jeopardy and the juvenile courts. Dicker-
son was charged with robbery in juvenile court. He admitted the facts
in the petition. Later an indictment was brought against him for the
same act and the district court dismissed it, finding that jeopardy at-
tached when Dickerson admitted his guilt before the juvenile court in
the earlier proceedings. The court of appeals interpreted the state stat-
ute and said that because the admission was made at a "detention"
hearing before recommendations for disposition were available or a
social study had been made jeopardy did not attach. In the District
of Columbia, unlike Oklahoma, a finding of jurisdiction due to delin-
quency was a proper antecedent to waiver of jurisdiction. However,
in reversing, the appellate court did not disagree with the lower court's
recognition of double jeopardy as applied to juveniles:
[Tjhe constitutional limitations are applicable if the final ac-
tion of the court may result in depriving a person of his lib-
erty. Whether the enforced incarceration may be in a jail,
penitentiary, reformatory, training school, or other institution,
is immaterial. What matters is the potential loss of liberty.2"
This "loss of liberty" concept was relied on in the leading case of Jones
v. Breed2 6 which held that when, on the basis of the delinquency hear-
ing, the juvenile court can impose severe restrictions upon the juvenile's
liberty jeopardy attaches. The court referred to Kent, Gault, and Win-
ship and held McKeiver's denial of the right to jury trial as inapplicable
to the double jeopardy issue. Citing Richard M. v. Superior Court,17
the court approved the decision that where a delinquency petition has
22. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and
Another Proposal, 114 U. PENN. L. Rav. 1171, 1212 (1966).
23. Benton v. Maryland, 385 U.S. 784 (1969).
24. 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
25. 168 F. Supp. at 901.
26. 497 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1974).
27. 93 Cal. Rptr. 752, 482 P.2d 664 (1971).
[Vol. 10:690
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been dismissed pursuant to a hearing on the merits, this is tantamount
to an acquittal, and a second prosecution is not allowed.28
Fain v. Duff29 is another important case finding double jeopardy.
There the juvenile was adjudged a delinquent based upon a petition
alleging rape; nine days later he was indicted for the same act. He
was kept in the school for boys following his adjudication as a delin-
quent but was not released when the school superintendent felt he had
been rehabilitated because Fain would have been jailed following his
release. The court said:
Thus, Fain's "custody" is even more apparent than that of
Peyton, since the existence of the outstanding indictment not
merely threatens him with more incarceration in the future,
it has a substantial effect on his present circumstances. 0
Perhaps the best and most recent example of how far the courts
are willing to extend the attachment of the double jeopardy concept
to juveniles is found in a recent Arizona decision.31 The juvenile was
committed to a state hospital after a finding that he was mentally defec-
tive and disordered. Although he was not adjudicated a delinquent,
the court expressly retained jurisdiction over him until he reached the
age of 21. No adjudication hearing was held. The Arizona Supreme
Court said:
A court should look past the form to the substance of an ac-
tion especially in view of the informal nature of juvenile pro-
ceedings then in effect. The entire philosophy of the juve-
nile court system would indicate that commitment to the State
Hospital is tantamount to a determination of the juvenile
status of the child. . . . Thus the petitioner was not only
placed in jeopardy in the juvenile court but was in effect con-
victed and punished. Any attempt to try him as an adult
would not only subject him to the harassment of an additional
judicial proceeding but would subject him to the risk of being
punished twice for the same offense. 2
In criminal proceedings for adults the exact point in time at which
jeopardy attaches can be determined fairly exactly. Generally it is
when the jury is impaneled and sworn, or if non-jury, when the first
witness is sworn. 33
For juveniles the attachment of jeopardy varies depending upon
28. See also Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
29. 88 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973). See also 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1974).
30. 488 F.2d at 222.
31. Coleman v. State, 519 P.2d 851 (Ariz. 1974).
32. Id. at 854.
33. 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 158 (1963).
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the statutes of the state. Due to the variance of these statutes from
state to state as well as the wide latitude given the courts by the parens
patriae theory which has a contiuing influence there is no exact or uni-
form point in time when jeopardy is considered to attach. But it is clear
from the state and federal decisions within the last ten years that protec-
tion against double jeopardy does apply to juveniles and it attaches
when the proceedings have reached the state at which the child's liberty
and freedom can be decided. Pinpointing this stage remains a prob-
lem, but, clearly, the situation in Garrison v. Jennings falls within the
range where a growing number of states have expressly required appli-
cation of this constitutional guarantee to juvenile proceedings.
Linda McKnight Shaw
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